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Rethinking Corporate Agency in Business, Philosophy and Law 
Samuel Mansell1  ∙  John Ferguson2  ∙  David Gindis3  ∙  Avia Pasternak4 
Abstract While researchers in business ethics, moral philosophy and 
jurisprudence have advanced the study of corporate agency, there have been very 
few attempts to bring together insights from these and other disciplines in the 
pages of the Journal of Business Ethics. By introducing to an audience of business 
ethics scholars the work of outstanding authors working outside the field this 
interdisciplinary special issue addresses this lacuna. Its aim is to encourage the 
formulation of innovative arguments that reinvigorate the study of corporate 
agency and stimulate further cross-fertilization of ideas between business ethics, 
law, philosophy and other disciplines.   
Keywords Corporation ∙ Group agent ∙ Corporate agency ∙ Corporate personhood ∙ 
Corporate rights ∙ Corporate responsibility ∙ Collective responsibility ∙ Interdisciplinarity 
Introduction 
Should we attribute agency exclusively to individuals, or can it also be a property of 
organized groups such as business corporations and states? If “corporate agents” exist, do 
they, and should they, have the same rights and responsibilities as individual human beings? 
What are the most suitable means for holding corporate agents responsible? How should 
responsibility for corporate misbehavior be shared among the human beings involved? And 
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how should responsibility for collective harm be shared within groups of individuals that do 
not qualify as corporate agents?   
A rich literature in business ethics, moral philosophy and jurisprudence is devoted to 
these fundamental questions of social ontology and their normative implications. But, with 
some notable exceptions (e.g. Orts and Smith, 2017), there have been relatively few attempts 
to bring together insights from these and other disciplines. Certainly, such attempts have been 
scarce in the Journal of Business Ethics. This special issue addresses this lacuna, in line with 
the recognition that ground-breaking ideas are likely to be interdisciplinary in nature (Arnold 
et al. 2016) and the ambition to broaden the intellectual base of business ethics scholarship 
(Greenwood and Freeman 2017). 
The proposal for this special issue arose from a conference on “Corporate Agency and 
Shared Responsibility” hosted by the University of St Andrews (St Andrews, UK) in 
November 2015, and a symposium on “The Nature and Governance of the Corporation” 
organized by the World Interdisciplinary Network for Institutional Research at the Università 
della Svizzera italiana (Lugano, Switzerland) in April 2015. At these events participants drew 
on perspectives from across the humanities and social sciences to rethink the concepts of 
corporate agency, collective responsibility and the nature of the corporation itself. Our aim 
here is to continue this dialogue between disciplinary perspectives in order to broaden and 
deepen the debate on corporate agency.  
Among business ethicists, the proposition that corporations are moral agents is a long-
established topic of controversy and debate (e.g. French 1979; De George 1981; Donaldson 
1982; Goodpaster and Matthews 1982; Velasquez 1983; Werhane 1985; May 1987; Pfeiffer 
1990). A consensus has not been reached, and while interest in the subject has somewhat 
subsided (Moriarty 2016), it has not disappeared (e.g. Moore 1999; Danley 1999; Velasquez 
2003; Altman 2007; Ashman and Wistanley 2007; Watson, Freeman and Parmar 2008; 
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Dubbink and Smith 2011; Rönnegard 2013; Lampert, 2016; Bowie 2017; Burt and Mansell 
2017).  
The subject has received a great deal of attention from moral philosophers. Alongside 
work that considers the very possibility of corporate moral agency and responsibility (e.g. 
Wellman 1995; Gilbert 2002; Miller and Makela 2005; Copp 2006; Isaacs 2011; List and 
Pettit 2011; Preda 2012), the ethical implications of corporate responsibility, including the 
appropriate responses to a delinquent corporate agent (e.g. Erskine 2011; Wringe 2012) and 
the distribution of responsibility within corporate agents (e.g. Held 2002; Pasternak 2011; 
Stilz 2011), have been debated. But the recent controversy surrounding the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s rulings in Citizens United5 and Hobby Lobby6 – which extended First Amendment 
protections to corporations – has brought an additional set of questions to the center stage.  
In what legal sense are corporations “persons”? Why has law assigned rights and 
responsibilities to corporate persons, and do these really belong to corporate persons qua 
corporate persons? How are these connected with individual moral rights and responsibilities? 
These questions have a long intellectual history (Canning 1996; Runciman, 1997; Black 2002; 
Turner, 2016). They were a hot topic among jurists at the turn of the twentieth century (e.g. 
Freund 1897; Gierke 1900; Maitland 1905; Deiser 1909; Machen 1911; Laski 1916), and are 
now making a comeback (e.g. Pollman 2011; Blair 2013; Coleman 2014; Greenfield 2015; 
Piety 2015; Gindis 2016; Robinson 2016; Greenwood 2017; Kurki and Pietrzykowski 2017) 
against a backdrop of widespread calls to restrict constitutional rights to human beings 
(Ripken 2011).  
The extension of constitutional rights to corporate persons has been identified among 
the critical events in the history of the corporate form with immediate relevance for business 
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ethics (Beets 2011). However, a survey of the leading journals in the field reveals that very 
little has been written on the topic. There has been an interest in the implications of Citizens 
United in terms of corporate political influence, which speaks to the familiar theme of the 
corporation’s role or place in society (e.g. Silver 2015; Stoll 2015; Néron 2016). Nonetheless, 
most of the articles connecting the issue of corporate personhood with ethical considerations 
pre-date the Citizens United case (e.g. Manning 1984; Phillips 1992; Stoll 2005; Ayer 2006; 
Pettit 2007; Hess 2013; Blair 2015; Sepinwall 2015). And there is surely more to say. 
A genealogy of corporate personhood might unearth fruitful insights for our evolving 
understanding of corporate agency; and so might thought experiments that reimagine 
corporate responsibility in a range of possible, and potentially unenviable, futures. These 
excursions beyond the familiar terrain of business ethics could yield a typology of corporate 
agents and confirm, or perhaps contradict, the idea that corporate agents must have both rights 
and responsibilities. Progress can, of course, be made by extending theories already 
established in the business ethics literature. For instance, original applications of Kantian 
ethics might enhance our understanding of the connections between corporate agency and 
individual and collective responsibility.   
This objective might likewise be served by novel efforts to match types of responsibility 
to types of collective. Arguably, considerations of this kind might help us decide where and 
how to assign blame. When combined with an examination of the identity conditions the legal 
mind relies on to attribute liability, particularly criminal liability, and historical accounts 
revealing how legislation and regulation have been subverted by corporations over time, these 
ideas can improve our comprehension of the extent to which regulation may enable 
responsible agency, while also helping us imagine the appropriate direction for corporate 
governance reforms.  
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These are the worthy objectives pursued by the contributors to this special issue. We 
have organized their articles around four key themes: agency, responsibility, personhood, and 
regulation. While many of the articles touch on most, or even all, of these four themes, our 
grouping is based on what we see as each article’s primary contribution.  
Agency 
In a strikingly original perspective on corporate agency, Tim Mulgan (University of St 
Andrews, UK) argues that we need an account that is temporally robust across a range of 
credible futures. He asks what future philosophers would think about corporate agency if they 
were to live in a future broken by climate change and material scarcity, or in a future 
populated by digital beings that have replaced flesh-and-blood humans. In such a broken or 
digital future, which no one can be certain will not happen, Mulgan shows that many of the 
assumptions of contemporary moral theory would no longer hold. He then examines the 
restrictions these credible futures must place on the theories of corporate agency we would 
bequeath to future generations.  
To avoid a future dominated by corporate groups that have no regard for human beings, 
Mulgan argues, the only temporally robust theory is “moralized extreme collectivism,” where 
morally reliable corporate groups, and only those groups, are recognized as both responsible 
agents and full moral persons. Morally unreliable groups, by contrast, should be denied 
agency altogether. As an example of the latter, he notes the disproportionate contribution of 
business corporations to anthropogenic climate change. Mulgan concludes that we must 
reorient our thinking about corporate agency and moral reliability before the world is 
populated by corporate groups whose priorities are entirely divorced from human concerns. 
From a very different perspective, Amy MacArthur (High Point University, USA) 
proposes an innovative theory of Kantian group agency. Although the individual human being 
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is, for Kant, the archetypical moral agent, his recognition of the state as a moral person whose 
actions are subject to the moral law shows that there is room for a Kantian account of how 
organized collectives can be held responsible for moral or immoral actions. Using the 
concepts that inform Kant’s theory of individual agency, and drawing on the philosophy of 
collective intentionality, MacArthur shows that groups, like individuals, can engage in 
practical deliberation and are able to develop a genuine “group maxim.”  
For MacArthur, a group maxim, which is not reducible to the sum of the maxims of all 
the individuals involved, is possible because members can deliberate from a group standpoint 
that is distinct from their standpoints as particular individuals. Accordingly, moral 
responsibility should be attributed to the author of the group maxim, that is, to the group 
itself. MacArthur’s contribution to what she calls “agency holism” focuses primarily on 
formally structured groups, namely those with explicit decision-making procedures. 
Nevertheless, she suggests, elements of the proposed theory may apply to informal kinds of 
groups as well. 
By contrast, Tobey Scharding (Rutgers University, USA) argues that Kantian ethics 
cannot hold corporations morally responsible because responsibility is, from a Kantian 
perspective, inalienable: a corporation cannot be held morally responsible for its members’ 
actions. However, instead of emphasizing what Kant cannot contribute to business ethics, 
Scharding pursues the alternative implication: business ethicists should use the resources of 
Kantian ethics to hold individuals, but not corporations themselves, responsible for corporate 
malfeasance. By focusing on how individuals contribute to actions taken in their 
organization’s name, she provides a model for decomposing business actions into their 
individual parts and reconstituting them in a context-specific maxim that Kantian ethics can 
evaluate. 
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Business ethicists, Scharding argues, should abandon the notion of collective 
responsibility, and use Kantian ethics, along with other individualistic ethical theories, to 
evaluate the actions of individual business people. The outcome of this strategy, according to 
Scharding, is an understanding of ethics that allows business ethics to do what it does best: to 
guide individuals in value-challenging decisions. For example, through an analysis of the 
Wells Fargo bogus-accounts scandal, she recommends that business ethicists focus on how 
individual decisions are shaped by the values that underpin their workplaces, rather than on 
the moral responsibility of the organizations in which they work. 
Responsibility 
Moral philosophers, as Stephanie Collins (University of Manchester, UK) observes, are often 
troubled by the idea of collective responsibility on the grounds that it violates core moral 
intuitions and principles. Consider the Great Pacific Garbage Patch (GPGP), a vast area in the 
North Pacific Ocean which is entirely covered by bits of plastic that are likely never fully to 
disintegrate. Who is responsible for this colossal environmental disaster? Clearly, no 
individual agent is responsible for the entire GPGP, as any individual contribution is 
negligible. But to argue for collective responsibility might seem nonsensical as well: after all, 
if groups are made of individuals, to hold a group responsible means nothing more than to 
hold their individual members responsible, often for things that they themselves did not do. 
Collins counters such critiques by showing that skepticism regarding collective 
responsibility stems from the failure to distinguish between different kinds of responsibility 
and different types of collective. There are different kinds of responsibility we might assign to 
individuals and groups, just as there are different types of collectives responsibility might be 
assigned to. Crucially, Collins argues, certain kinds of responsibility may be assigned to 
certain kinds of collectives in ways that are not reduced to individual responsibility. Although 
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there will be cases where we are unable to attribute the responsibility we might want to, 
which Collins calls “collective responsibility gaps,” we should not take these to be sufficient 
grounds for rejecting the concept of collective responsibility.  
Mihailis Diamantis (University of Iowa, USA) examines a particularly vexing potential 
responsibility gap, namely the thorny problem of holding corporations criminally liable. As 
Diamantis explains, one of the core tenets of criminal justice is that the agent that is punished 
is the agent that committed the crime. But in the case of corporations, which regularly go 
through “diachronic identity shifts” – including mergers, spin-offs and acquisitions – it is 
difficult to identify the agent that committed the crime. If we want our legal system to hold 
corporate entities criminally liable, we must have a principle that, on the one hand, does not 
violate our core intuitions about punishing the right agents and, on the other hand, does not 
offer corporate criminals an easy way out through an identity change.  
Diamantis draws on ongoing debates in the philosophy of personal identity, cognitive 
science and business ethics to offer a conception of diachronic corporate identity which 
coheres with the corporate “criminal essence theory” he proposes. According to this theory, 
which Diamantis argues can be defended while remaining neutral on the metaphysics of 
corporate personhood, a present-day corporation is identical to a past corporate criminal if 
(and only if) it retains whatever organizational shortcoming led the past corporation to 
commit a given crime. As Diamantis shows, this approach is analytically robust, and sits well 
with our intuitions about corporate identity and responsibility. More importantly, it serves the 
key purposes of criminal justice, namely retribution, rehabilitation and deterrence.   
Personhood 
The tension between the legal practice of treating corporations as persons and slogans that 
“corporations are not people,” which in the wake of Citizens United stem from the feeling that 
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artificial persons have been allowed to dominate natural persons, is addressed by Jon Garthoff 
(University of Tennessee, USA). A compelling justification for the moral, and thus legal, 
priority of natural over artificial persons is sorely needed, and this involves, according to 
Garthoff, a fundamental revision of the doctrine of legal personhood. Legal personhood 
should be decomposed into its two main components, “standing” (roughly, the possession of 
rights) and “liability” (roughly, the possession of obligations), and the expectation that a legal 
person must have both standing and liability should be qualified.  
While some legal persons have both standing and liability, other legal persons have 
standing but no liability, whereas others still have liability but no standing. For Garthoff, 
entities with phenomenal awareness, which are able to feel pleasure and pain, have moral 
standing. But only those with the capacity to think about reasons and justifications, and the 
capacity to regulate action accordingly, have moral obligations. An infant has rights but no 
obligations, while an adult in full possession of her faculties has both rights and obligations. 
Thanks to procedures which constitute group deliberation and group action, corporations have 
moral obligations, including the duty to meet the legal obligations set by society. But since 
they lack phenomenal consciousness, corporations lack moral standing. This implies, Garthoff 
concludes, that they are not suitable holders of constitutional rights.  
Setting aside the legitimacy of corporate constitutional rights, Nneka Logan’s (Virginia 
Tech, USA) examination of the racialized roots of corporate personhood is as important as it 
is timely. Logan argues that the Supreme Court’s ruling in the 1886 case of Santa Clara,7 
which extended the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection clause and, by implication, due 
process, to corporate property, has had profound implications for race relations in the United 
States. The Fourteenth Amendment’s original intent, Logan writes, was to protect the 
personhood of freed slaves and their descendants, ensuring their equal treatment before the 
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10 
 
law, and its extension to corporate personhood devitalized it and helped consolidate corporate 
power.  
American corporations went on to actively oppress generations of African Americans 
by adopting race-based labor market policies and fostering a managerial identity underpinned 
by white supremacy. Many discriminations continued even after the Civil Rights movement 
of the 1960s, and before long affirmative action, a regulatory tool promoting racial redress, 
was re-conceptualized as diversity management. While diversity management keeps race 
relations on the corporate radar it is less concerned with righting the institutional wrongs of 
the past than with the economic requirements of the organization. A more meaningful 
understanding of “corporate responsibility to race” is needed. Using recent corporate 
campaigns as examples, Logan spells out some of the steps to be taken in this direction.   
Regulation 
The question of how to best foster responsible corporate agency is the focus of Garrath 
Williams’s (University of Lancaster, UK) contribution. The commonly accepted view that 
agents lacking the ability to respond to moral reasons are less responsible for their actions 
produces, Williams points out, a strange result in the corporate context. If culpability and 
capability go hand in hand, a company with second-rate executives, operating in a poor 
regulatory environment, would be less responsible for any misdeeds it may commit because 
of its management’s inability to appreciate that better actions were available. Since this 
conceptual tangle is the product of abstract theorizing about culpability, Williams proposes 
that we put on our practical hats and think about what holding an agent responsible involves.  
It is important to recognize, Williams argues, the social nature of responsibility: varied 
forms of joint action and cooperation among a plurality of agents are involved. This does not 
mean that agents need to have a shared goal or that they deliberately cooperate, but only that 
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their actions mesh within a larger framework which allocates responsibilities and fosters the 
capacities to fulfil those responsibilities. Regulatory standards, like other ways of defining 
and upholding norms, thus play an important role in fostering responsible corporate agency. 
By creating a shared acknowledgement that some mode of conduct is unacceptable, Williams 
explains, well-designed and properly enforced regulation “enables” companies to act in ways 
that are acceptable to society as a whole.     
David Ciepley’s (University of Denver, USA) take on regulation leads to a different 
conclusion. While it stands to reason, Ciepley observes, that corporations should provide 
public benefits in exchange for the privileges which come with incorporation (most notably, 
entity shielding and limited liability), the history of the corporate form is a story of gradual 
extrication from responsibility. Charters have long lost their ability to ensure the alignment of 
corporate interests and the public interest, and our capacity to deter corporate misconduct by 
brandishing the threat of legal punishment is limited. Fines levied against the legal entity or 
given natural persons within the corporation, or both, are often ineffective and potentially 
unjust, and attempts to target corporations qua group agents do not appear to help.  
It follows, according to Ciepley, that regulation and punishment, while necessary, will 
always be insufficient and need to be supplemented by corporate governance reforms which 
decrease the temptation to engage in misconduct in the first place. It is the corporate control 
structure, and the associated corporate culture, which requires our utmost attention. Given the 
questionable impact of existing compliance programs, Ciepley argues, more far-reaching 
solutions should be on the table. From this perspective, he concludes, Danish-style “industrial 
foundations,” which not only favor long-termism but also direct a portion of their dividends to 
charity, thereby reinstating the norm that for-profit corporations provide public benefits, hold 
the most promise. 
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Future research 
We hope that readers will find in the ideas offered by these outstanding scholars a source of 
inspiration for further work. The nine articles in this special issue, taken individually or 
collectively, identify a number of problems, defend a number of positions and, inevitably, 
raise many additional questions and puzzles about corporate agency and responsibility. The 
following, non-exhaustive, list of themes readers might wish to address in ensuing 
explorations is based on both the contributions to this special issue and our own view of the 
important avenues for future research. 
While recent discussions of corporate agency and responsibility have advanced our 
understanding of the issues involved we are still some way from a consensus regarding the 
corporation’s moral status. In particular, the issue of corporate moral rights, and their legal 
protection, will no doubt continue to worry many, not least because of the apparent 
inconsistency with the basic tenets of a liberal political order. More work attempting to 
surmount this tension, building on a variety of resources, ranging from normative to applied 
ethics, and from liberal political thought to institutional economics, is required. Endeavors of 
this kind will likely need to distinguish between different types of corporate agents, different 
kinds of legal rights and, more importantly, different reasons for assigning them.  
We must also admit that there is a large degree of uncertainty regarding how to deal 
with groups which do not qualify, in the standard sense, as corporate agents. Many of the 
problems societies face today, including over-population and environmental degradation, are 
caused by the indirect and interacting contributions of many individual agents. Understanding 
patterns of agency across such unstructured groups, and the moral and legal responsibilities 
that might fall on their members, can help us imagine forward-looking solutions to these and 
other challenges. Here, too, the tension with the principles of liberal thought will need to be 
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addressed, and interdisciplinary research into kinds of unstructured groups, types of 
responsibilities, and once again, different reasons for assigning them, will be valuable. 
A final area of concern is how to deal with the emergence of non-human entities, such 
as robots, electronic agents and various forms of artificial intelligence. This is no longer 
merely a possible future; it already is the present. Further research into the parallels to be 
drawn between corporate agency and the agency of these entities is needed. The question of 
which legal norms should govern their operation and our relationships with them should also 
be at the forefront of our investigations. As governments begin to draft legislation clarifying 
where liability for harm caused by such entities should lie the question of how to deal with the 
likely responsibility gaps is fundamental. Research combining insights from law, philosophy, 
economics, robotics, and other disciplines will be of paramount importance.      
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